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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2) (k) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE I: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN REFUSING PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION TO THE EFFECT 
THAT THE STANDARD OF CARE FOR AN INEXPERIENCED SIXTEEN YEAR OLD 
DRIVER IS THE SAME AS THE STANDARD OF CARE FOR AN EXPERIENCED ADULT 
OPERATING AN AUTOMOBILE. 
ISSUE II: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN REFUSING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE DEFENDANT'S EXPERT 
ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION WITNESS DESPITE THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT 
FAILED TO SPECIFICALLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY CONVEY THE WITNESS' NAME 
AND ADDRESS TO PLAINTIFF SEASONABLY BEFORE TRIAL, DESPITE A 
CONTINUING INTERROGATORY REQUESTING THE NAMES OF EXPERT WITNESSES 
AND A COURT ORDER TO PROVIDE PLAINTIFF WITH THE NAMES OF EXPERT 
WITNESSES WELL BEFORE THE START OF TRIAL. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Both issues are governed by the abuse of discretion standard. 
See, e.g. Pearce v. Wistisen. 701 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1985). A 
ruling by the trial court will be reversed under this standard if 
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it "'had a substantial influence in bringing about the verdict.1" 
Id., quoting In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1976). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are determinative of the 
question at issue in this appeal: 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 401: 
'Relevant evidence1 means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to 
the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 402: 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the 
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these 
rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this 
state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 (b) (4): 
Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts, 
otherwise discoverable under the provisions of 
Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and acquired or developed 
in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be 
obtained only as follows: 
(A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require 
any other party to identify each person whom the 
other party expects to call as an expert witness at 
trial, to state the subject matter on which the 
expert is expected to testify, and to state the 
substance of the facts and opinions to which the 
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expert is expected to testify and a summary of the 
grounds for each opinion. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 (e): 
A party who has responded to a request for discovery with 
a response that was complete when made is under no duty 
to supplement his response to include information 
thereafter acquired, except as follows: 
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to 
supplement his response with respect to any 
question directly addressed to (A) the identity and 
location of persons having knowledge of 
discoverable matters, and (B) the identity of each 
person expected to be called as an expert witness 
at trial, the subject matter on which he is 
expected to testify, and the substance of his 
testimony. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51: 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time 
as the court reasonably directs, any party may file 
written requests that the court instruct the jury on the 
law as set forth in said requests. The court shall 
inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests 
prior to instructing the jury; and it shall furnish 
counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless 
the parties stipulate that such instructions may be given 
orally or otherwise waive this requirement. If the 
instructions are to be given in writing, all objections 
thereto must be made before the instructions are given to 
the jury; otherwise, objections may be made to the 
instructions after they are given to the jury, but before 
the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may 
assign as error the giving or the failure to give an 
instruction unless he objects thereto. In objecting to 
the giving of an instruction, a party must state 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds 
for his objection. Notwithstanding the foregoing 
requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and 
in the interests of justice, may review the giving or the 
failure to give an instruction. Opportunity shall be 
given to make objections, and they shall be made out of 
the hearing of the jury. 
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made 
after the court has instructed the jury. The court shall 
not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court 
states any of the evidence, it must instruct the jurors 
that they are the exclusive judges of all questions of 
fact. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiff and appellant Stanley Summerill brought this action 
in the Second Judicial District Court to recover compensation for 
injuries he sustained as a result of a severe automobile collision. 
(R. 1-4) The trial resulted in a jury determination that Defendant 
Scott Shipley was not negligent in causing the collision. (R. 210-
212). On or about March 1, 1993, plaintiff made a Motion for New 
Trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(R. 411-442). On or about July 12, 1993, the trial court denied 
plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial. (R. 474-476). On or about 
July 28, 1993, plaintiff filed his notice of appeal. (R. 477-481). 
On or about November 19, 1993 the Supreme Court poured this matter 
over to the Court of Appeals for disposition. 
Statement of Facts and Disposition 
1. On or about October 12, 1988, the vehicle driven by 
plaintiff Stanley Summerill was struck by a vehicle owned by 
defendant Stephen Shipley, and driven by defendant Scott Shipley, 
a minor at the time of the collision. (R. 2-4). 
2. As a result of the collision of October 12, 1988, Mr. 
Summerill suffered serious personal injuries which required 
hospitalization and extensive further medical care. (R. 3-4). 
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3. On or about September 9, 1991, plaintiff submitted, among 
other questions, the following interrogatories to Defendant Scott 
Shipley, pursuant to Rule 26 (b) (4) (a) (i) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 52: Have you or your representatives hired 
any experts to determine the cause of the collision or to 
reconstruct the collision? 
INTERROGATORY NO. 53: If the answer to the preceding 
Interrogatory is affirmative, state the name and address of 
the expert whom you have hired for that purpose. 
4. Pursuant to court order, given in a pretrial conference 
of October 6, 1992, (R. 765) plaintiff submitted a witness list to 
defense counsel on or about October 30, 1992 (R. 74-78), which date 
was approximately one month before the close of discovery. 
5. Defendants did not submit any witness list to plaintiff, 
or identify expert witnesses with any reasonable degree of 
specificity, until at least December 18, 1992, two weeks after 
discovery had closed and approximately two weeks before the 
beginning of the trial. (See Exhibit "A", a true copy of the 
December 18, 1992 letter from defense counsel to plaintiff's 
counsel.) Even in the December 18, 1992, defense counsel 
acknowledges that no witness list had been sent, and that 
defendants "may have Ron Probert testify about a few points 
regarding the accident itself." [Emphasis added]. 
6. Defendants did not specifically and unequivocally affirm 
that they would call Mr. Probert as an expert witness, and provide 
his address, until the Pre-Trial Order dated December 31, 1992, 
four days before the start of the trial. (R. 262.) 
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7. Because of defendants' failure to specifically inform 
plaintiff of his expert accident reconstructionist witness in 
sufficient time to allow plaintiff to conduct discovery as to him, 
plaintiff made a written Motion In Limine Re: Exclusion of Expert 
Witnesses at the commencement of the trial of this action, seeking 
for the court to sanction defendants for their failure to provide 
the name and address of their proposed experts in answer to 
plaintiff's interrogatory, and also for their failure to comply 
with the court's order that the parties exchange expert witness 
lists. (R. 249-255). 
8. After some argument in chambers, this court denied 
plaintiff's Motion In Limine Re: Exclusion of Expert Witnesses, and 
allowed defendant to present expert testimony from Ronald Probert, 
basing its decision, at least in part, on the court's "notes from 
the pretrial [of October 6, 1992] ... that the defendant indicated 
at that time that Mr. Probert would be the accident 
reconstructionist." (R. 662). 
9. The transcript of the pretrial which the court referred 
to indicates that, in response to a question from the court as to 
what experts the defense had considered for trial, defense counsel 
stated that "I think we will probably use an accident 
reconstructionist. I have talked to Mr. Ron Probert about that." 
[Emphasis added]. (R. 763). 
10. At the pretrial conference of October 6, 1992, the court 
clearly issued an order for "a list of witnesses to be exchanged 
between you two by the — you should know that by November 2nd so 
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that there is no surprise." [Emphasis added]. (R. 765). As noted 
above, plaintiff complied with this order, by submitting his 
witness list on or about October 30, 1992 (R. 74-78) , but 
defendants failed to comply with the order. 
Plaintiff had no opportunity to depose Mr. Probert or conduct 
any discovery as to his theories or findings. It is undisputed 
that defendants did not notify plaintiff, unequivocally and in 
writing, prior to the close of discovery, of their definite intent 
to call Mr. Probert. Further, Mr. Probert did not prepare a 
written report of his conclusions, so plaintiff had no opportunity 
to prepare for Mr. Probert's testimony, or to adequately prepare 
for cross-examination. 
11. At trial, in opening and closing statement and through 
testimony of his expert accident reconstructionist, defense counsel 
made a torrent of arguments to the jury that the jurors should 
judge the driving conduct of the 16-year-old defendant as conduct 
appropriate and reasonable for a new, inexperienced, 16-year-old 
driver. Defense counsel argued, and defendants1 accident 
reconstruction expert stated, that the jury should not hold the 
young defendant to as high a standard of care in the operation of 
a motor vehicle as that to which they might hold other, more 
experienced drivers. (See, e.g. R. 672, "[y]ou are going to have 
to conclude whether or not what Scott Shipley did at the time of 
this accident was properly driving or inappropriate driving 
considering his age and his driving experience. He was a 16-year-
old driver at the time. Many of you have children or have had 
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children who were 16-year-old drivers and you know what that's 
like" and R.675, the road was "unexpectedly very slick, especially 
for a young 16-year-old driver" and R. 677 "[a] young driver.•.he's 
turning into it trying to correct it as best he can" and R. 590, 
"[y]ou have to try to project yourself into his situation, back 
when you were 16 years old, just learning how to drive and you are 
in a similarly dangerous situation, unexpected, you cope with it as 
best you can" and R. 591, "it just happens out on those roads and 
you're all older, more experienced drivers and so you can cope with 
that...") 
12. Defendant's collision reconstruction expert, Ronald 
Probert, offered his expert opinion which was identical to the 
theory argued by defense counsel, which was that an inexperienced 
driver has a lesser duty of care, and thus, that the careless 
actions of the 16 year old defendant were not negligent. (See R. 
523, "[w]hat I think he did wrong, I think he is a young 
inexperienced driver...".) 
13. Because of the consistent, repeated arguments by defense 
counsel that the inexperienced 16-year-old defendant driver had a 
lower duty of care than other drivers, together with the supporting 
evidence from the defense expert, plaintiff's counsel requested an 
instruction to clarify the true state of the law, which instruction 
stated: 
A minor engaging in an adult activity, that is, an 
activity which is normally performed by adults and which 
requires a higher degree of maturity and judgment than 
activities minors would normally engage in, is held to 
the same standard of care as an adult engaging in that 
activity. 
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After argument, the court denied this jury instruction. Plaintiff 
clearly and specifically objected to the court's denial of his 
requested instruction prior to the court's instructing the jury, as 
required by Rule 51. (R. 615-616, 634-635) 
14. The jury returned a verdict of no cause of action. It 
responded "No" to the first special verdict interrogatory, which 
asked whether defendant was negligent in causing the collision. 
15. Plaintiff made a Motion for New Trial based on the trial 
court's failure to instruct the jury pursuant to plaintiff's 
requested instruction cited above, and the court's denial of 
plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Mr. Probert's testimony. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks the reversal of the trial court's erroneous 
rulings and its abuse of discretion in refusing to instruct the 
jury fully on plaintiff's theory to avoid confusion and in refusing 
to grant plaintiff's Motion in Limine to exclude surprise expert 
witnesses. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court abused its discretion to plaintiff's 
substantial prejudice in failing to give the instruction requested 
by plaintiff on the standard of care for a minor operating a motor 
vehicle. This abuse of discretion had a substantial impact on the 
verdict, and requires reversal. 
II. The trial court abused its discretion to plaintiff's 
substantial prejudice by failing to exclude defendants' expert 
9 
accident reconstructionist, Ronald Probert. Plaintiff was not 
notified, in writing, of defendants1 intent to call Mr. Probert, 
until approximately two weeks before trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, AND 
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR, IN FAILING TO OFFER 
THE CORRECTIVE INSTRUCTION OFFERED BY PLAINTIFF 
REGARDING THE STANDARD OF CARE FOR A YOUNG 
INEXPERIENCED DRIVER OF A MOTOR VEHICLE 
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in 
pertinent part, that "any party may file written requests that the 
court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in said requests." 
In the instant case, plaintiff submitted a written requested 
instruction, as set out in the fact section, paragraph 13, above, 
requesting the court to instruct the jury that a minor, when 
engaged in an adult activity such as driving a motor vehicle, is 
held to the same standard of care as an experienced adult driver. 
The instruction requested by plaintiff was acknowledged by the 
court as a correct statement of the law. (R. 616). Nevertheless, 
the court denied the proffered instruction, despite the fact that 
a consistent and oft-repeated theme in defendants1 case was that 
Defendant Scott Shipley was an inexperienced, 16 year old driver, 
and that the jury should judge him by a lower standard of care than 
would be applicable to more experienced drivers. (See, e.g. R. 
672, "[y]ou are going to have to conclude whether or not what Scott 
Shipley did at the time of this accident was properly driving or 
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inappropriate driving considering his age and his driving 
experience. He was a 16-year-old driver at the time. Many of you 
have children or have had children who were 16-year-old drivers and 
you know what that's like" and R.675, the road was "unexpectedly 
very slick, especially for a young 16-year-old driver" and R. 677 
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 ta] young driver. . .he's turning into it trying to correct it as 
best he can" and R. 590, "[y]ou have to try to project yourself 
into his situation, back when you were 16 years old, just learning 
how to drive and you are in a similarly dangerous situation, 
unexpected, you cope with it as best you can" and R. 591, "it just 
happens out on those roads and you're all older, more experienced 
drivers and so you can cope with that...") 
The trial court's abuse of its discretion in denying the 
requested instruction is sufficient error to warrant a new trial 
where, as here, the requesting party is substantially prejudiced by 
the failure to give the instruction which correctly states the law. 
This Court has stated that "[f]ailure to give requested jury 
instructions constitutes reversible error only if their omission 
tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party 
or erroneously advises the jury on the law." Biswell v. Duncan, 
742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah App. 1987), accord In re Estate of Kesler, 
702 P.2d 86, 96 (Utah 1985) and Jorcrensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80, 82 
(Utah App. 1987). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the right of a litigant 
to "have his theory of the case presented in such a way as to aid 
the jury and not confuse it." Morrison v. Perry. 140 P.2d 772, 778 
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(Utah 1943) . In the context of the torrent of erroneous and 
misleading argument offered by defense counsel on this subject, 
coupled with incorrect statement of law in the evidence, from 
defendants' reconstruction expert, who concluded that Defendant 
Scott Shipley was not negligent, in part because "he is a young 
inexperienced driver" (R. 523), the instruction requested by 
plaintiff was essential to clarify the true state of the law. The 
theory espoused by defendants is not a correct statement of the 
law, and its repeated assertion by defense counsel and his expert, 
without correction from the court, confused the jury and 
constituted error. 
This clear error was compounded by the jury instructions when 
taken as a whole, as they must be for purposes of a challenge to 
the failure to give a requested instruction. See, e.g. Biswell v. 
Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah App. 1987). It is true that a number 
of the instructions regarding general duties of drivers, 
particularly instructions numbers 23-24 and 28, make broad 
statements to the effect that "it is the duty of every driver to 
use reasonable care" (see R. 173-174, 179), which could arguably be 
interpreted, despite the repeated arguments of defendants1 counsel 
and expert to the contrary, to include minor drivers such as the 
defendant here. Contrasting with these instructions, and leading 
to a morass of confusion, are the instructions which seem to allow 
the jury to decrease the 16-year-old driver's duty of 
reasonableness and negligence. Such instruction allowed the jury 
to determine "what a prudent person with similar knowledge would do 
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in a similar situation" (R. 164) , and instructed the jury that "the 
amount of care that is considered 'reasonable1 depends on the 
situation." (R. 165). 
When read as a whole, in light of the erroneous arguments of 
counsel and the misleading conclusions of defendants' expert, the 
instructions seem to lead naturally to the conclusion that a young, 
inexperienced 16-year-old driver is behaving reasonably when he 
enters a curve on a slippery road (which he arguably did not 
realize were slippery because of his inexperience) at 40 miles per 
hour (which he arguably believed was a reasonable speed because he 
had been taught to accelerate on the freeway merging ramp), loses 
control, overcorrects (which he arguably did because of his 
inexperience) and causes a collision, because he handled the 
situation much as another young, inexperienced driver might have 
done. This conclusion is not a correct statement of the law, and 
when the instructions seem to offer direct support for defendants' 
incorrect arguments and evidence in this manner, there is 
substantial prejudice to the plaintiff which must be remedied by a 
new trial. 
In a somewhat analogous situation, wherein the plaintiff 
requested a separate, clarifying instruction stating that the 
standard of care when dealing with children is higher than that 
used when dealing with adults, the Colorado Court of Appeals 
approved the giving of the additional, illuminating instruction. 
Zimmer v. Celebrities, Inc., 615 P.2d 76, 80 (Colo App. 1980). 
Despite defendant's argument that it was error to give the jury two 
13 
instructions regarding the standard of care, and that the 
instructions were repetitive and potentially misleading, the Zimmer 
court held that n[t]he second instruction accurately paraphrased 
C.J.I. 9:7 in part and went on to provide the 'further definition1 
of reasonable care as to children under the case law of Colorado." 
Id. The instruction requested by the plaintiff, and refused by the 
trial court in this case, was directly analogous to the proffered 
instruction in Zimmer — it was meant to clarify the somewhat 
confusing issue of standard of care where there is a minor, just 
learning to drive, who accepts the responsibility of operating a 
motor vehicle on public roads. With this right must come the 
burden of being held to the standard of care of one who has 
reasonable training and experience with road conditions and vehicle 
control. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that ff[t]he purpose of jury 
instructions is to inform the jury of applicable law in terms that 
they can readily understand. They should be concise and clear in 
meaning and in lay people's language and not contain belabored 
legal definitions.11 [Emphasis added]. Penelko, Inc. v. John Price 
Associates, Inc.. 642 P.2d 1229, 1234 (Utah 1982). Where, as here, 
the jury instructions leave an ambiguity as to whether the jury is 
to assess the defendant's conduct according to the standard of an 
experienced, seasoned driver or according to a similarly placed 16-
year-old new driver, the instructions have failed in this basic 
purpose, recognized by the Supreme Court as essential to proper 
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instructions. The trial court's failure to rectify this confusion 
was error, which must be remedied by a remand for a new trial. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that 
The confusion created by [ambiguous] . . . instructions may 
well have denied [plaintiff] a fair trial. 'What the 
party is entitled to is a presentation of the case to the 
jury under instructions that clearly, concisely and 
accurately state the issues and the law applicable 
thereto so that the jury will understand its duties. ' 
Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 830 P.2d 270, 274-275 
(Utah 1992), quoting Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 
12, 354 P.2d 564, 566 (1960) • 
Here, the right recognized by the Court has been denied, by a 
combination of defense counsel's artful argument, defendants' 
expert's legally erroneous conclusions and the ambiguous, often 
simply misleading, jury instructions which were not clarified as 
requested by plaintiff. 
Plaintiff is entitled to a trial by a fully and correctly 
informed jury. The failure of the trial court to offer plaintiff's 
requested instruction, which correctly stated the nuances of the 
law to be applied to the facts, was reversible error. This Court 
should remand for a new trial with appropriate instruction in this 
regard. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING 
TO SANCTION DEFENDANTS FOR THEIR FAILURE TO 
UNEQUIVOCALLY INFORM PLAINTIFF OF THEIR INTENDED 
EXPERTS IN A TIMELY FASHION, AS REQUIRED BY THE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND COURT ORDER 
Defendants first notified plaintiff in writing of the 
possibility that they would call Mr. Probert as an expert witness 
on December 18, 1992, more than two weeks after this court had 
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ordered discovery closed and only sixteen days before trial, (See 
Exhibit "A".) Plaintiff was precluded from conducting any 
discovery as to this expert, whose testimony, apparently believed 
wholeheartedly by the jury, was fatal to plaintiff's case. In the 
same letter, defense counsel refers to the close of discovery which 
had already passed. Thus, at the time of this notification he was 
aware it was too late for plaintiff to conduct further discovery. 
Defendants1 tardy notification left plaintiff no opportunity 
to probe the findings and the expected testimony of this expert 
prior to trial. Plaintiff first confronted him when the 
defendants' offered him as an expert accident reconstructionist at 
trial. Plaintiff had no opportunity to prepare for this testimony, 
particularly since Mr. Probert prepared no report of his findings. 
Defendants cleverly waited until after the close of discovery 
to definitively notify plaintiff of their expert witnesses. This 
court should not condone tactics of "trial by ambush and surprise." 
Here defendants gained a distinct tactical advantage by presenting 
witnesses whose findings, opinions and conclusions were unknown to 
plaintiff. 
A. Defendants Obtained an Unfair Tactical Advantage by Violating 
Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and by Disobeying 
a Court Order to Provide the Names of Their Experts 
Defendants' tactical advantage was obtained by violating the 
Rules of Civil Procedure and by disobeying a court order that they 
provide the names of their expert witnesses. Such unjust advantage 
should not be countenanced. 
16 
Plaintiff inquired of Defendant Scott Shipley, by means of 
interrogatories early in the discovery of this action, whether "you 
or your representatives hired any experts to determine the cause of 
or to reconstruct the collision" and, if so, to "state the name and 
address of the expert whom you have hired for this purpose." 
Plaintiff had a right to this information, pursuant to Rule 
26(b)(4)(A)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, 
defendants had a duty to supplement this information pursuant to 
Rule 26(e)(1). Defendants made no such supplementation until after 
the expiration of plaintiff's time to conduct further discovery as 
to these experts. 
Additionally, the trial court ordered, at the October 6, 1992 
pretrial conference, that the parties exchange witness lists. 
Although this order was apparently never memorialized in writing, 
the fact remains that it was ordered, and that plaintiff was able 
to comply. Even after receiving plaintiff's witness list, which 
should have triggered defendants1 recollection of the order, they 
did not submit any notification of their intended expert witnesses 
until after the close of discovery. It is interesting that defense 
counsel can vividly remember that portion of the pretrial 
conference in which he gave an informal, non-committal statement of 
who he might call as an expert, yet he was unable to recall the 
court's clear and specific order to exchange witness lists, even 
after he received plaintiff's list in compliance with this order. 
17 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated, in general comments on the 
purpose and uses of the discovery rules of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, that 
Their purpose is to make procedure as simple and 
efficient as possible by eliminating any useless ritual, 
undue rigidities or technicalities which may have become 
engrafted in our law; and to remove elements of surprise 
or trickery so the parties and the court can determine 
the facts and resolve the issues as directly, fairly and 
expeditiously as possible. [Emphasis added]. Ellis v. 
Gilbert. 429 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah 1967). 
Further, the Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he idea of making a 
lawsuit a game of tricks by keeping information secret to surprise 
the opposition at a critical moment is more suited to the 
fictionalized drama of stories and plays than to actual trials in 
a court of justice." State ex rel Road Commission v. Petty, 412 
P.2d 914, 917 (Utah 1966). The Supreme Court of New Jersey has 
stated similar concerns, holding that "[t]he rules for discovery 
here involved were designed to eliminate, as far as possible, 
concealment and surprise in the trial of law suits". Evtush v. 
Hudson Bus Transp. Co., 81 A.2d 6, 9, 27 A.L.R.2d 731 (New Jersey 
1951). 
Other jurisdictions, in interpreting similar rules and 
requirements of notification to opponents of proposed expert 
witnesses in a timely fashion, have held that timely notice is 
essential, and preclusion of testimony from the surprise witness is 
a just and acceptable sanction for failure to follow the rules. 
The Court of Appeals of Hawaii, for example, has repeatedly held 
that "Rule 18(a)(1) of the Rules of the Circuit Court [an analogous 
discovery rule] must be scrupulously followed if we are to have 
18 
fair trials." [Emphasis added.] Boudreau v. General Elec. Co., 
625 P.2d 384, 389 (Hawaii App. 1981). 
As to the length of time between the time defendants clearly 
and in writing notified the plaintiff of their intent to call Mr. 
Probert and the trial, the two week period is not adequate to 
alleviate the substantial prejudice to plaintiff. On similar 
facts, the Supreme Court of Iowa, in ruling on the exclusion of a 
proffered witness who was not identified until three weeks before 
trial, stated that "[t]hree weeks, while not the eve of trial, is 
a relatively short period when contrasted with the long period 
discovery had then taken." Sullivan v. Chicago & Northwestern 
Transp.. 326 N.W.2d 320, 325 (Iowa 1982). Here, the short time 
before trial is compounded by the fact that discovery had closed, 
and so plaintiff had no opportunity to depose the witness or 
otherwise prepare for his testimony. 
Likewise, on the issue of whether the oral "notice" at the 
pretrial conference of defendants1 consideration of Mr. Probert as 
a possible expert, the Supreme Court of Texas, in interpreting that 
state's local rules, which, admittedly, are more direct and more 
harsh than those at issue here, has stated that: 
[identification of witnesses in response to discovery 
must be in writing; oral notice is not proper. This 
avoids the inevitable disputes over who said what when. 
The fact that a witness1 identity is known to all parties 
is not itself good cause for failing to supplement 
discovery. A party is entitled to prepare for trial 
assured that a witness will not be called because 
opposing counsel has not identified him or her in 
response to a proper interrogatory. [Emphasis added.] 
Sharp v. Broadway Nat. Bank, 784 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex 
1990). 
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Similarly, authorities and commentators assessing the federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (upon which Utah's rules are based) and 
similar state court rules, have stated that, where a party has 
failed to comply with duties to seasonably and clearly provide 
notice of expert witnesses, the sanction of preclusion of that 
expert's testimony is called for. See, e.g. Developments in the 
Law — Discovery 74 Harvard Law Review 940, 962 ("If it is assumed 
that the duty to answer interrogatories is a continuing one, the 
logical sanction for a breach would appear to be a refusal to allow 
the recusant party to introduce the surprise testimony at the 
trial.") and Comment, Exclusion of Witness's Testimony Where 
Witness Is Not Disclosed on An Interrogatory, 1964 Illinois Law 
Forum 456, 457 (1964), ("The answer to the argument that exclusion 
of testimony frustrates the basic policy of the trial procedure 
rests in the fact that compliance with discovery rules will best 
effectuate the policy of presentment of all available truth before 
the trier of fact, and adequate sanctions are necessary to enforce 
compliance." [Emphasis added, citations omitted.] and 23 Am. Jur. 
2d Depositions and Discovery § 70 ("The responding party is 
obligated to identify its expert witnesses explicitly, even if the 
witness was previously identified as a person having knowledge of 
discoverable matter.") 
To allow defendants to benefit by their unjustified failure to 
comply with clear discovery rules and orders, to plaintiff's 
substantial prejudice, is to allow defendants to obtain advantages 
by unfair and unjust strategy. The further effect of such 
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strategies, and the tacit acceptance of them by the courts, is to 
weaken the Rules of Civil Procedure and the assurances of 
regularity and order established thereon. Because of defendants' 
failure to specifically inform plaintiff of the expert witness they 
intended to call, and to supplement their responses to plaintiff's 
interrogatories in sufficient time to allow plaintiff to conduct 
trial discovery, plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse and remand for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should properly reverse the trial court's erroneous 
rulings, and remand for a new trial, because: 
1. Plaintiff requested a jury instruction which specifically 
stated the correct standard of care for minors engaging in adult 
activities, such as driving an automobile. This court denied the 
requested instruction, despite the fact that the thrust of 
defendants' argument, and opinions offered by their expert, focused 
on the theme that Defendant Scott Shipley was a 16 year old driver, 
and that the jury should judge his actions by a lower standard than 
that applied to experienced drivers; and 
2. The trial court should have granted plaintiff's Motion In 
Limine re: Exclusion of Expert Witnesses, as plaintiff had no 
opportunity to depose or otherwise prepare to address the surprise 
21 
testimony of defendants' expert witnesses, and he was severely 
prejudiced thereby. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _J day of January, 1994. 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
5 
John Farrell Fay 
Jim Mouritsen 
Attorneys for the plaintiff 
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January, 1994, two copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF were 
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Lynn S. Davies 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main #700 
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KEY BANK TOWER 
50 SOUTH MAIN 7TH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 2465 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110-2465 
(801) 531-1777 FAX (801) 532-5506 December 18, 1992 
VIA TELEFAX NO, 266-1338 
Ned P. Siegfried 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
310 East 4500 South, Suite 620 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Re: Summerill v. Shipley 
Our File No. 6016-1074 
Dear Ned: 
I wanted to touch base with you on a few outstanding 
discovery issues. First, last time we talked you had asked me for my 
witness list. I noted that I was surprised that we had not sent one 
to you if the court had ordered one. Upon checking, I found that the 
reason we had not sent it to you was because the courts Scheduling 
Order made no reference to it, so it was never docketed in our 
office. However, I certainly do not intend to try to hide who my 
witnesses will be. As I stated before, I believe that you know who 
all those witnesses are. In addition to some of the treating 
physicians or other witnesses listed on your witness list, we intend 
to call Dr. Nord, who performed the IME, I intend to use my client's 
deposition as we stipulated, and I* may*"have Ron Probert testify about 
a few points regarding the accident itself. 
As to your last set of written discovery, it fell due 
following the discovery cut-off date, but because we have worked well 
in cooperating on this case so far, I suppose that I will voluntarily 
give you some of that information any way. However, for the most ^  ^ _ 
part, I intendedj^to^object^to your -requests vf or
 t. inf oraation va^to^oiir 
experts/' I "will" give^you la 'definite"response within*the* next couple 
of days. 
Finally, as to the outstanding discovery that each of us 
owes the other from early in the case, I have written responses from 
my client which I am willing to give to you, assuming that you will 
return the favor and give me your client's responses. I will 
stipulate that my client's written responses are in fact his and can 
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be treated as such in this case, but of course, I will not be able to 
get a signature from my client because he is in Portugal. Also, I 
should note that nearly all of the questions that you posed were 
handled in the deposition of my client that was just recently taken. 
If you want to discuss any of these matters, please give me 
a call. 
Sincerely, 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
&»NELSON 
in S. Davies 
LSD/pm 
Summer9. opp 
